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W INTRODUCTION idespread variations in geography, socioeconomic structures, and culture, cannot conceal the com-mon opportunities and challenges that nave affected African families in the last ten years since the International Year of 
the Family in 1994. The family as a unit of production, consumption, 
reproduction, and accumulation, has been profoundly impacted by the 
economic downturns that transformed the environment in which fami-
lies make their decisions. These broader socio-political and economic 
environments provide the contexts for understanding changes in Afri-
can family structures. Opportunities have arisen from considerable so-
cioeconomic changes that continué to alter the structure of the family 
away from traditional patterns to new ones generated by the expansión 
of education, health care, employment, and migration. Yet the same 
forces that engender significant vistas for families have also produced 
múltiple constraints. African families are embedded in political and 
socioeconomic circumstances that are characterized by long-standing 
domestic dynamics of economic fragility, debilitating poverty, poor 
governance and civil conflicts. Throughout the 1990s, the scourge of 
HIV/AIDS has put additional pressures on the sustainability of families 
and households. Similarly, the new demands unleashed by forces of 
globalization have had mixed outcomes for African families, simulta-
neously enhancing the chances of families to seize the opportunities 
for participation in larger economic exchanges while at the same time 
heightening their vulnerability to these forces. As a result, the state of 
African families is clouded by the competing strains of social regenera-
tion and economic constraints. 
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I. CHANGES IN FAMILY STRUCTURES 
1.1. Fertility Rates 
Fertility behavior in sub-Saharan África, like other parts of the 
world, is determined by biological and social factors. Several factors 
have contributed to sustain relatively high levéis of fertility in most 
of sub-Saharan África. These factors include high levéis of infant and 
child mortality, early and universal marriage, early child bearing as well 
as child bearing within much of the reproductive life span, low use of 
contraception and high social valué placed on child bearing. 
In the face of perceived high infant and child mortality, the fear of 
extinction encouraged high procreation with the hope that some of the 
births would survive to carry on the lineage. Interestingly, it is also 
believed that Rwanda's birth rate is on the increase because Rwandans 
generally believe it is their moral duty to replace the one million or so 
people that perished during the genocide. 
The high valué traditionally placed on marriage ensured not only its 
universality but also its occurrence early in life with the consequence 
that child bearing started early and in most cases continued until 
late into the productivity span. The institution of polygamy, which 
sometimes promotes competition for child bearing among co-
wives, also contributed to sustaining high fertility. Use of modern 
contraception was traditionally unacceptable as it violated the natural 
process of procreation. The traditional long period of breast-feeding and 
postpartum abstinence guaranteed adequate spacing between children. 
Available evidence suggests that there have been changes in these 
socio-cultural factors over time. Age at marriage appears to have 
increased, though minimally; it is still relatively low in rural settings 
and higher in urban settings. Use of modern contraception has increased, 
especially use of condoms in the wake of HIV/AIDS, and improved 
education (especially of women) appears to have gradually eroded 
some of the traditional valúes placed on child bearing. 
Changes in the structure of African families still reflect the enduring 
tensions between traditional and modern valúes and structures. Although 
there have been widespread accounts of families abandoning key 
traditional practices in favor of modern ones, the major trend remains 
the creation of systems of marriage and family organization that draw 
on both traditional and modern norms. The dominant feature of African 
families, as one observer notes, is its ability to "make new things out 
of oíd," and to draw forth new solutions from the traditional resources 
of family institutions'. As a result, the process of social adaptation of 
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family organizations has produced an uneasy amalgam that is yet to 
crystallize into a dominant pattern. Thus the trend toward modernity has 
been captured in the gradual transformations of African marriage and 
family organizations away from corporate kinship and extended families 
toward nuclear households. This shift stems, in part, from the breakdown 
of collective, kinship-oriented systems of production and reproduction. 
Where nuclear households have solidified, there have equally been 
significant shifts from high to low fertility rates in African families. 
Although demographers long attributed the prevalence of high fertility 
rates in África to the resistance of indigenous socio-cultural systems to 
external forces, the rapid expansión of educational opportunities and 
availability of contraceptive methods have contributed to the emerging 
perception that large families are an economic burden2. 
Despite significant internal differences between urban and rural 
settings and among African regions, the slow rates of economic growth 
and the mismatch between educational outcomes and labor opportunities 
have compelled smaller family sizes. In most urban áreas, factors such 
as wage labor, the monetized economy and cost of living, have altered 
the valué of children. In addition, while family networks previously 
mediated the negative effects of large families, resource constraints and 
economic decline have contributed to the reduction of family sizes and 
denuded the institutional structures of the extended family. 
Recent research conducted using data from the World Fertility 
Surveys (WFS) and the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) 
reveáis conclusively that in many African countries, fertility started to 
decline before 1975 in urban áreas, and was quite advanced by 1995; 
in rural áreas, fertility decline started about 10 years later. Despite 
variations in the speed and timing, by 1995, most African countries 
had lost on average about 25% (about 2 children) of original fertility 
levéis.3 Data gathered from 19 countries in Southern, Eastern, Central 
and Western África shows that the timing of the onset of transition in 
1 Therese Lauras-Lecoh, "Family Trcnds and Demographic Transition in África," International Social Science 
Journal, vol. 42, no. 4, 1990, p. 489. 
2 Cheikh Mbacke, "Family Planning Programs and Fertility Transition in Sub-Saharan África," Population 
and Developinent Review, vol. 20, no. 1, 1998, pp. 188-93; Sangeetha Madhavan, "Female Relationships 
and Demographic Outcomes in Sub-Saharan África," Sociological Forum, vol. 16, no. 3, 2001, pp. 503-27; 
J.C. CaldweII, "Fertility in Sub-Saharan África," Population and Development Review, vol. 20, no. 1, 1994, 
pp. 179-87; and J. C. CaldweII, "The Demographic Implications of West África Family Systems," Journal of 
Comparativo Family Systems, vol. 27, no. 2, 1996, pp. 331-52. 
3 Michclc Garenne and Veronique Joseph, "The Timing of the Fertility Transition in Sub-Saharan África," 
World Development, vol. 30, no. 10, 2002, pp. 1835-1843. See also Mamta Murthi, "Fertility Change in 
Asia and África," World Development, vol. 30, no. 10, 2002, pp. 1775-1776; and Barney Cohén, "The 
Emerging Fertility Transition in Sub-Saharan África," World Development, vol. 26, no. 8, 1998, pp. 1431-
1461. 
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fertility varied significantly between urban and rural áreas (Table 1). 
For urban áreas, it varied from 1.28% a year in Uganda to above 4% 
in Cameroon, Central African Republic and Mali. The variations were 
even greater in rural áreas: from 0.787% a year in Namibia to above 
4.0% a year in Cote d'Ivoire and Rwanda, to above 6.0% in Benin. In 
Kenya, where demographic data is more reliable, studies show that the 
speed of fertility decline has been steady: -2.64% in urban áreas, and 
-1.62 in rural áreas. Overall, there are modérate to large declines in 
fertility in Kenya, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Botswana, South África, and 
Cote d'Ivoire, with smaller declines in Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, 
Senegal, and Sierra Leone4. 
The key explanatory variables for fertility declines revolve around 
the levéis of urbanization and prevalence of contraceptives (Tables 2 
and 3). With urbanization levéis cióse to 50% in most African countries, 
cities have become the source of new lifestyles and means of access 
to health and contraceptive services. Despite the strong links between 
urbanization and the prevalence of contraceptives and reductions in 
fertility, surveys conducted in Kenya suggest that precipitous declines 
have affected all socioeconomic and demographic groups. Thus 
fertility has fallen in both rural and urban áreas, within all age groups, 
and across all provinces, irrespective of socioeconomic background5. 
Research conducted among the Kikuyu of Central Province, Kenya, 
reveal significant urban-rural variations in the valué of children 
despite aggregate fertility declines. Peri-urban áreas characterized by 
socioeconomic changes, notably the decline in traditional agricultural 
systems of production and the increasing ownership of land by women, 
as well as education and access to contraceptives have reduced the 
demand for large families. Further challenging the economic valué 
of children is the economic deterioration that has increased the costs 
of having many children. In contrast, high fertility rates persist in 
the more rural communities where social institutions and cultural 
practices continué to dominate and where there are fewer educational 
opportunities and limited use of contraceptives6. 
4 Michele Garenne and Veronique Joseph, "The Timing of the Fertility Transition in Sub-Saharan África," 
World Development, vol. 30, no. 10, 2002, pp. 1835-1843. 
5 Kenya National Council for Population and Development, Kenya Demographic and Health Survey, 1993. 
Nairobi: National Council for Population and Development, 1994 and W. C. Robinson, "Kenya Enters the 
Fertility Transition," Population Studies, vol. 46, no. 3, 1992, pp. 445-57. 
6 Neil Price, "The Changing Valué of Children Among the Kikuyu of Central Province, Kenya," África, vol. 
66, no. 3, 2001, pp. 411-33. 
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Table 1: Timing 
Country 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central African Republic 
Comoros 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Ghana 
Kenya 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malí 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Chad 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
oftheFertilityTran 
Date of la test survey 
1996 
1988 
1992 
1987 
1998 
1994 
1996 
1994 
1993 
1998 
1986 
1997 
1992 
1996 
1997 
1992 
1997 
1999 
1992 
1997 
1989 
1996 
1996 
1998 
1995 
1996 
1994 
sition in Sub-Saharan África, by country 
ONSETOFFERTIL1TY 
Urban 
1983 
<1974 
1975 
1981 
1985 
1990 
<1982 
1980 
1965 
1960 
1970 
1982 
1991 
1984 
<1979 
1979 
1985 
1981 
1971 
1964 
1970 
1988 
1970 
1970 
1977 
1970 
DECLINE 
Rural 
1990 
1974 
1986 
1993 
1990 
1987 
1990 
1990 
1970 
1993 
1985 
1991 
<1979 
1993 
1985 
1985 
1986 
1982 
1977 
1991 
1977 
1984 
Deviation U/R 
1983 
1960 
1975 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1980 
1965 
1960 
1970 
1983 
1975 
1984 
1970 
1984 
1985 
1969 
1971 
1970 
1970 
1984 
1970 
1970 
1977 
1970 
SPEED 
Urban 
-3.19 
-2.38 
-3.67 
-1.46 
-4.29 
-4.31 
-3.52 
-3.07 
-1.74 
-2.64 
-2.27 
-3.29 
-4.41 
-2.59 
-1.32 
-1.97 
-5.48 
-3.59 
-1.85 
-1.81 
-2.29 
-4.22 
-2.14 
-1.28 
-2.28 
-2.78 
Rural 
-6.33 
-3.49 
-4.91 
-3.19 
-3.53 
-4.68 
-4.78 
-2.77 
-1.62 
-3.02 
-2.01 
-3.81 
-0.84 
-3.23 
-5.19 
-4.62 
-1.81 
-6.03 
-1.08 
-3.58 
-1.09 
-4.19 
Source: Michele Garerme and 
World Development, 30(10): I 
Veronique Joseph,. 
840. 
'The Timing of the Fértil i ty Transí tion in Sub-Saharan África,' 
Table 2: Urbanization in Sub-Saharan African Regions, 1950-2025 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ H PERCENTAGE OF THE l'OI'L I.ATION IN URBAN ÁREAS 
REGIÓN 
Sub-Saharan África 
Eastern África 
Middle África 
Southern África 
Western África 
1950 1975 1996 2025 (projerted) 
11 
5 
14 
38 
10 
21 
13 
27 
44 
23 
32 
23 
33 
48 
37 
49 
39 
50 
62 
56 
Source: UN, World Urbanization Prospects: The 1996 Revisión 
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Table 3: Contraceptive Prevalence ¡n Sub-Saharan África, 1990s 
H H H ^ I H TOTAL VVOMEN USING MODKRN CONTRACEPTIVES 
REGIÓN 
Eastern África 
Middle África 
Southern África 
Western África 
20% or higher 
Kenya 
Zimbabwe 
Botswana 
Namibia 
South África 
10% to 19% 
Malawi 
Rwanda 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Lesotho 
Swaziland 
Ghana 
Less than 10% 
Burundi 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Madagascar 
Uganda 
Sudan 
Cameroon 
Central African Republic 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
Congo Brazzaville 
Burkina Faso 
Ivory Coast 
Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Níger 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Togo 
Source: Cari Haub and Diana Cornelius; Populatlon i-eference Burean 1997, World Population Data 
Equally important to the broader fertility declines in África is the 
phenomenon of delayed marriage and childbearing. Demographers 
have established a link between delayed changes in marriage and 
Africa's incipient fertility transition. These trends have been captured 
frora comparative studies of childbearing women between the ages 
of 20-24 and 45-49 that suggest that while most African women still 
marry young, the proportion of women marrying before the age of 20 
has declined rapidly in most countries (Table 4). In East África, eight 
of the nine countries surveyed showed a substantial shift toward later 
marriages. In West África, two countries -Senegal and Guinea- have 
shown marked change between older and younger women. Other 
studies have reinforced this perspective, revealing the emergence of a 
recent trend toward later age at marriage and age at first birth in Ghana, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Togo, and Uganda. Although the changes in timing 
of marriages is attributable largely due to the positive relationship 
between urbanization and educational attainment, these changes are 
also noticeable among rural women and women with no education7. 
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Table 4: Measure of Nuptiality ¡n Sub-Saharan África 
PERCENTAGE OF 
WOMEN MARRIED 
BYAGE20 
COUNTRYAND 
JRVEY 
EASTERN ÁFRICA 
Burundi, 1987 
Eritrea, 1995/6 
Kenya, 1993 
Malawi, 1992 
Rwanda, 1992 
Tanzania, 1996 
Uganda, 1995 
Zambia 1994 
Zimbabwe 
CENTRAL ÁFRICA 
Cameroon 1991 
CAR 1994-95 
SOUTHERN ÁFRICA 
Botswana, 1988 
Namibia,1992 
Womcn 
(20-24) 
Women 
(45-49) 
MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE (WOMEN 
25-49) 
Urban Rural 
Leve) of Education 
44.3 
69.5 
46.1 
76.6 
35.1 
60.3 
74.7 
64.3 
51.7 
53.7 
79.4 
68.9 
65.9 
64.0 
70.1 
73.5 
81.6 
61.7 
18.9 
18.0 
20.6 
18.5 
21.4 
18.7 
18.7 
18.7 
19.5 
19.5 
16.3 
18.5 
17.6 
20.0 
18.2 
17.2 
17.5 
18.7 
19.4 
16.2 
17.0 
17.4 
19.4 
17.0 
16.6 
16.8 
17.5 
19.8 
17.9 
19.4 
18.1 
20.3 
19.3 
17.4 
17.3 
18.5 
22.3 
23.9 
21.5 
___ 
23.2 
... 
20.5 
— 
20.8 
None Primary Secondary Total 
19.5 
16.7 
18.8 
17.7 
20.0 
18.2 
17.4 
18.0 
18.9 
73.1 
73.5 
85.7 
69.6 
17.4 
16.9 
16.0 
17.6 
15.2 
17.4 
17.6 
17.0 
20.3 
17.7 
92.5 
20.1 
81.5 
23.1 
17.3 
— 
17.3 
24.0 
16.9 
22.6 
17.4 
24.8 
17.9 
... 
16.5 
17.3 
17.3 
24.8 
WESTERN ÁFRICA 
Benin, 1996 
Burkina Faso, 1992-93 
Ivory Coast, 1994 
Ghana, 1993 
Guinea, 1992 
Liberia, 1986 
Mali, 1995-96 
Niger, 1992 
Nigeria, 1990 
Senegal, 1992-93 
Togo, 1988 
65.4 
85.6 
58.3 
59.7 
77.1 
64.1 
82.1 
90.1 
67.6 
59.7 
63.0 
71.6 
88.4 
67.4 
59.8 
95.0 
69.5 
91.2 
92.9 
71.9 
82.5 
66.2 
19.2 
17.9 
18.8 
19.5 
16.8 
18.5 
17.0 
15.4 
19.0 
18.2 
19.7 
18.0 
17.4 
17.8 
18.6 
15.6 
16.8 
15.8 
15.0 
16.3 
15.7 
17.9 
18.0 
17.5 
17.7 
18.5 
15.6 
16.8 
15.9 
15.0 
15.8 
15.8 
17.8 
19.3 
17.7 
18.4 
18.3 
16.5 
17.3 
16.6 
17.1 
19.1 
19.3 
18.8 
23.0 
21.0 
21.4 
22.3 
20.2 
20.5 
20.5 
. „ 
23.9 
23.0 
22.5 
18.4 
17.5 
18.1 
18.8 
15.8 
17.5 
16.0 
14.9 
16.9 
16.2 
18.4 
Source: Population Bulletin, Volume 51, No.l, April 1996. 
Despite the decline in fertility, the population of sub-Saharan África 
is still expected to double within the next 22-23 years, (see Table 9). UN 
Population statistics identify 16 countries with a combined population of 
269 million in 2000, that are expected to witness an overall quadrupling 
of population 2000 and 2050, to slightly under 1 billion. 14 of these 16 
countries are in África. The African countries in this high fertility group 
are: Angola, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Congo, the Democratic Republic 
Michcfe Garenne and Veronique Joseph, "The Timing of the Fertility Transition in Sub-Saharan África," 
WorldDevelopment, vol. 30, no. 10, 2002, pp. 1835-1843 and C. F. Westoff, Age ai Marriage, Age al First 
Birth, and Fertility in África. Washington DC: World Bank Technical Paper no. 169, 1992. 
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of the Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, 
and Uganda. Similarly, of the 10 countries with the highest population 
growth rates, 6 are in África: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Eritrea, Liberia, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. Furtherraore, in the 
1995-2000 period, these countries had a total fertility of 5.74 children 
per woman, which is projected to decline to 2.51 children per woman 
in2045-508. 
1.2. Polygyny 
A critical continuity in African family patterns relates to the 
persistence of polygynous practices. The much-anticipated decline in 
polygynous households is still far from a social reality in most African 
countries. In rural áreas, polygyny survives largely because of the 
imperatives established by the sexual división of labor that marks the 
sphere of agriculture. Múltiple wives, and by extensión, many children, 
are valued because they continué to provide essential labor services in 
rural agricultural production. But in most African urban áreas, polygyny, 
once fairly common, is becoming rare, in particular among the younger 
generations. Comparative studies from Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone, and Tanzania show that monogamous households have 
taken a greater hold on society9. Among the Igbo of Nigeria, polygyny 
seems to be a declining form of marriage as the strength of the 
conjugal relationship predominates over other family and community 
relationships. Young Igbo couples tend to have fewer children than 
their parents as knowledge and use of modern contraceptives has 
expanded. More importantly, increasing education, urban migration, 
and employment have created new courtship patterns that emphasize 
individual choice; these patterns, in turn, provide women with relative 
equality in the arena of sexuality and mate selection. These changes, 
however, have neither reduced the importance Igbo society places 
on fertility and parenthood ñor altered the continuing importance of 
kinship networks in Nigeria. Consequently, while fertility rates have 
declined across generations and women have gained more decisional 
latitude in the family, the enduring importance of kinship rooted in 
African social structures continúes to impose significant constraints on 
women's individual autonomy and choice10. 
8 United Nations Population División, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revisión, New York, 2002, p. 7. 
9 Rita Schafer, "Variations in Traditional Marriage and Marriage Forms: Responses to Changing Pattern of 
Family-Based Social Security System in Sierra Leone and Kenya," History ofthe Family, vol. 27, no. 2,1997, 
pp. 1-13; Dominique Meekers and Franklin Nadra, "Women's Perceptions of Polygyny Among the Kaguru of 
Tanzania," Ethnology, vol. 34, no. 4, 1995, pp. 315-30; and B. Adams and E. Mburugu, "Kikuyu Bridewealth 
and Polygyny Today," Journal of Comparative Family Studies, vol. 25, no. 2, 1994, pp. 159-66. 
10 Kamene Okonjo, "Aspects of Continuity and Change in Mater-Selection Among the Igbo West of the River 
Niger," Journal oj Comparative Family Studies, vol. 23, no. 3, 1992, pp. 339-41. 
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1.3. Single-Parenthood 
Another factor that is undermining kinship-based family structures 
is the prevalence of single parenthood, particularly among young 
urban females. As increasing numbers of women have joined the labor 
forcé, single and female-headed households have become a discernible 
pattern on the African social landscape". Although some societies 
continué to frown upon women over 30 who are still single, accusing 
them of prolonging singlehood, this new trend reflects attempts to adapt 
to secular changes in educational status, employment and occupational 
mobility, and in some cases, the decline of marriageable men. However, 
studies from most African cities have also shown that female-headed 
households are over-represented among the poor. Africa's unplanned 
urban sprawls are populated with unmarried single and poor women 
who face considerable obstacles in overcoming dislocation, migration, 
and deprivation12. 
In South África, apartheid policies in many forms directly 
impacted family cohesión and reinforced the destructive influences 
that urbanization and industrialization had on the family Thus, one 
consequence of the legacy of apartheid is the high number of single-
parent families, resulting largely from pregnancy outside marriage and 
from divorce. As a large proportion of the nation's children grow up 
in female-headed households with little fmancial support, the African 
family in South África has continued to suffer considerably greater 
disintegration than families have in the rest of the continent. There have 
been links established between illegitimacy and poverty, inadequate 
childcare, and psychological difficulties, with enormous consequences 
on the downward spiral of family disintegration in South África13. 
Coping with the circumstances of family disruption in most African 
countries has entailed single-parent families among lower-income 
groups taking their children to live with relatives, in particular, the 
children's grandparents. In South África, childcare problems and 
restrictions by many employers on children of their workers residing 
11 P. Antonie and J. Nanitelamio, "More Single Women in Afriean Cities; Pikine, Abidjan, and Brazzaville," 
Populaüon, vol. 3, 1991, pp. 149-69. 
12 Sean Jones, "Single Hood for Security: Toward a Review of the Relative Economic Status of Women 
and Children in Woman-Led Households," Socieíy in Transition, vol. 30, no. 1, 1999, pp. 13-27; Sandra 
Wallman, Kampala Women Cetling By in the Age ofAlDS. London; James Currey, 1996; E. Preston-Whyte, 
"Women who are not Married: Fertility, 'Illegitimacy1, and the Nature of the Households and Domestic 
Groups Among Single African Women in Durban," South African Journal ofsociology, vol. 24, no. 3, 1993, 
pp. 63-71. 
13 E. Preston-Whyte, "Women who are not Married: Fertility, 'Illegitimacy', and the Nature of the Households 
and Domestic Groups Among Single African Women in Durban," South Afriean Journal of Sociology, 
vol..24, no. 3, 1993, pp. 63-71. 
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on their premises has strengthened the roles of African grandparents in 
bringing up their grandchildren. This has also reinforced the customary 
practices of multi-generation households where mutual support 
between generations guarantees the well-being of a person born into 
African families throughout their life cycle. Recent national surveys in 
South África indícate that the proportion of older black South Africans 
living in two-, three-, and four-generation households has remained 
fairly stable since the early nineties14. A study of 300 three-generation 
households in two metropolitan áreas of South África revealed that 
about nine in ten African elders live in multi-generation households 
and that the ethos of the African extended family appears to be intact 
even in the urban settings. Over 80% of the top, middle and bottom 
generations in the 300 families studied reported harmonious relations 
between generations. Other studies in KwaZulu-Natal Province found 
that grandmothers perceive themselves as important in building 
families, educating younger generations, and providing generational 
continuity15. A survey of rural women of KwaZulu-Natal with an 
average age of 51 years indicates that most of them felt empowered 
when they took responsibility for important family decisions including 
the education of grandchildren. In addition to being homemakers, the 
women were proud of adopting the 'traditional male' role as providers 
of the family if their men were unemployed16. Since the major source 
of funds for multigenerational support for grandchildren are pensions 
from grandparents, the post-apartheid South African government has 
continued to make transfers in the form of the state old-age pensión 
to extended families. As a result, pensions have enhanced the status of 
elderly household members as income earners and provided lifelines to 
poorer older households17. 
1.4. Fosterage 
While the South African cases illustrate that the multi-generation 
African family is not on the decline, economic downturns and increased 
urban poverty in the rest of África have undermined the institution 
of fosterage that for long sustained the ties between rural and urban 
households. Fosterage constitutes part of the trend where the welfare of 
14 Valerie Moller and R. Devey, "Black South African Families with Older Members: Opportunities and Cons-
traints," Southern African Journal ofGerontology, vol. 4, no. 2, 1995, pp. 3-10. 
15 M. G. Cattell, ""Zulú Grandmother's Socialization of Granddaughters," Southern African Journal ofGeron-
tology, vol. 6, no. 1, 1997, pp. 14-16. 
16 A. Sotshongaye and Valerie Moller, 1996, "'My Family Eats This Money Too': Pensión Sharing and Self-
Respect Among Zulú Grandmothers," Southern African Journal o/Gerontology, vol. 5, no. 2, 1996, pp. 9-19. 
17 M. Ferreira, "Of Pensions, Caters and Homes for the Aged," Southern African Journal ofGerontology, vol. 
7, no. 1, 1997, pp. 1-2. 
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rural dwellers depends on their solidarity ties with urban kin families. 
A key component of this practice is the channeling of remittances from 
urban workers to rural áreas through educational support. By conferring 
parental responsibilities to their urban relatives, fosterage guaranteed 
the mobility of children from rural families. Over the years, the 
fosterage of African children had important demographic and economic 
consequences. It subsidized high fertility among rural and poor families 
and gave poor families the means of defraying child-rearing costs. In 
addition, when poor and large families transferred the guardianship of 
their children to smaller and wealthier families, fosterage mitigated 
inequalities in resource endowment among children. Recent research, 
however, shows that the prolonged economic reversal witnessed 
throughout África has weakened fosterage networks, jeopardizing the 
welfare of rural families and the strength of ruralurban relationships18. A 
study of Cameroon shows a net decline in rural-to-urban fosterage rates 
during the years of its economic decline, decline that foretells a more 
generalized weakening of rural-urban relationships. As the economy 
deteriorated, was the real income of most urban households severely 
reduced and urban unemployment was pushed to unprecedented heights, 
making it impossible for urban families to support foster children. 
Although these changes have created more disincentives for large 
families in both rural and urban áreas, the decline of fosterage raises 
concerns about the economic mobility prospects for children from rural 
families, especially in a climate of increased competition for limited 
formal-sector employment19. 
1.5. Changes in Rural Áreas 
The breakdown in the symbiotic and mutually beneficial exchanges 
between rural and urban communities is equally matched by radical 
changes within rural households. This results from the collapse of the 
traditional African family economy in which husbands were the chief 
breadwinners. This economy has gradually been making way for wage-
earning family households whereby both the husband and wife have to 
strive to earn income primarily in the agricultural sector. Yet the transition 
to wage-earning households has occurred without corresponding shifts 
in power relations between the sexes, producing tensions that further 
18 C. S. Stokes, "Explaining the Demographic Transition: lnstitutional Factors in Fertility Decline,1' Rural 
Sociology, vol. 60, no. 1, 1995, pp. 1-22; Gordon and Gordon 1996; M. Ainsworth, "Economic Aspects of 
Child Fostering in Cote dTvoire," Research in Population Economics, vol. 8, 1996, pp. 25-62;; A. K. Blanc 
and C. B. Lloyd, "Women's Work, Child-Bearing and Child-Rearing over the Life Cycle in Ghana," in A. 
Adepoju and C Oppong, eds., Gender, Work, and Population in Sub-Saharan África. London: James Currey, 
1994, pp. 112-31. 
19 Parfait M. Eloundou-Enyegue and Shannon Stokes, "Will Economic Grises in África Weakcn Rural-Urban 
Ties? [nsights from Child Fosterage Trends in Cameroon," Rural Sociology, vol. 67, no. 2, 2002, pp. 1-21. 
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destabilize the family. Silberschmidt's work on the Kisii in Kenya 
demonstrates the momentous changes in household structures as control 
over resources has shifted gradually away from men to women20. With 
rarapant unemployment and dwindling resources, men's central roles 
as breadwinners have been redefined, making it impossible for most 
men to fulfill these roles. As a consequence, men have felt a loss of 
power, and, unable to provide for their families, they have frequently 
turned to alcoholism, brutality, rape, and extramarital sex for succor. 
In contrast, women's main role as daily household and farm managers 
remains in cióse conformity with the traditional expectations and 
thus they have been better able than men to achieve the social valúes 
embedded in their gender roles. Yet as men are threatened by societal 
changes, the persisting patriarchal structure of powers allows men to 
nullify women's economic contribution to the family, thus heightening 
poverty and marital stress. 
1.6. Policy Implications of Changes in Family Structures 
Widespread availability of economic, education, and health 
opportunities will continué to have remarkable influences on the changes 
in African family structures. What is noteworthy about these changes 
is the complexity, adaptability, and flexibility of family forms within 
their respective social and cultural contexts. Thus there is a universal 
consensus that policies that strengthen such adaptability remain critical 
to maintaining the intricate balance between traditional norms and 
emerging forms of family organization. In particular, there is need for 
policies that: 
- Enhance the status and importance of women in the attainment of 
fertility reductions. The driving forcé for fertility reduction has 
been the ability of African women to control their reproduction, 
particularly in the use of contraceptives. Since the persistence of high 
fertility rates are correlated with minimal involvement of women 
in reproductive decisions, family planning schemes that empower 
women regarding the use of contraceptives need to be given more 
priority in policy plans. Successful family planning programs with 
strong political support invariably undermine the preference for large 
families21. 
20 Margrethe Silberschmidt, 'Women Forget that Men are the Masters': Gender Antagonism and Socio-
Economic Change in Kisii District, Kenya. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999; and Silberschmidt, 
"Disempowerment of Men in Rural and Urban East África: Implications for Male Identity and 
SexualBehavior," WorldDevelopment, vol. 29, no. 4, 2001, pp. 657-71. 
21 Ezekiel Kalipeni, "The Fertility Transition in África," Geographicaí Review, vol. 86, no. 3, July 1995, p. 
294. 
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- In most of África, lower levéis of infant mortality have been 
correlated with lower fertility rates, underscoring the importance of 
health programs that target prenatal and postnatal health. Because of 
the comparatively high childhood mortality in África, many families 
have felt the need to have more children. 
- Since the prevalence of single-parent families is becoming a major 
trend of African families, programs targeted at enhancing the 
economic opportunities of single-mothers, in particular, need to be 
better incorporated in national plans. Most African countries do not 
have legislation that guarantees maternity leave for single working 
mothers, policies that need to be adopted to respond to the new social 
trend. Childcare for single mothers is also necessary to reduce the 
social and economic burdens on these new family forms. 
- National policies to reduce the gaps between rural and urban áreas 
should better incorpórate fosterage as an essential economic and 
social institution. In this respect, more flexible tax policies that 
reward fosterage would help in alleviating the costs of fosterage for 
urban dwellers. 
- Checking the deterioration of men's power in rural households is 
fundamentally an economic problem of expanding the productivity 
of agriculture and promoting off-farm industrial activities that créate 
jobs that give both men and women more economic flexibility. 
II. THE RISE OF MIGRATION 
In much of África, internal migration forms a significant component 
of the livelihood systems of millions of families. For years, migration 
from rural to urban áreas has been the essential mechanism for job 
opportunities, social mobility and income transfers. Nearly one third 
(32%) of sub-Saharan Africans lived in urban áreas in 1996, up from 
11% in 1950 (see Table 2). The UN projects that nearly one-half (49%) 
of sub-Saharan Africa's population will be urban by 202522. With most 
of Africa's urban population reaching cióse to 50 per cent, migration to 
cities continúes to deepen the rural-urban ties, in particular strengthening 
the dependence of rural households on the remittances of migrants. 
The impact of urban migration on African families still reflects the 
abiding tensions between the imperatives of economic survival and 
social dislocations. In Southern África where urbanization is higher, 
the legacy of out-migration from the poorer and agrarian economies 
of Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, and Zambia to the more industrialized 
22 International Migration: A Global Challenge; Population Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 1, April 1996. 
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South African economy continúes to have a profound impact on the 
structure of African families. Even though post-apartheid South África 
has gradually began to reduce dependence on migrant workers from the 
región, the previous migration patterns have altered the socioeconomic 
contexts in which households thrive23. 
Studies from Swaziland show that labor migration has had corrosive 
effects on kinship ties. The out-migration of Swazi men to South 
African mines has forced women to undertake the rearing of children 
alone; many households lack the stabilizing influence of a father and are 
thus incapable of providing the support network that is the foundation 
of family stability. In addition, the large numbers of single women in 
Swaziland has increased poverty levéis, yet paradoxically, while single 
women may be poorer, they have more control of household resources 
and are freer to channel more resources towards health than women 
who live with men24. 
Nowhere are the changes on family structures felt more than in 
Lesotho, which is more proximate to South África. A recent study 
reveáis that virtually every Lesotho household depends directly or 
indirectly on migrant financial monthly remittances from South África 
for survival. It is estimated that 40 per cent of the male labor forcé in 
the 20-39 age group is away in South África at any given time. In 1990, 
migrant remittances contributed 43.7 per cent of the Lesotho's GNP. 
Yet this positive aspect is outweighed by the far-reaching implications 
on the development of the family system. Out-migration has invariably 
led to the decline of agricultural production as wives of migrants are 
entrusted with subsistence farming activities. Erratic rains, drought, 
shortage of fertile land, and lack of markets for agricultural producís 
have all compounded the decline. More important, one out of 10 Lesotho 
married men working in South África has abandoned his wife and taken 
on new ones in South África. Most of the abandoned wives become 
single parents and many of their children are not catered for adequately; 
moreover, abandoned wives often become the targets of married men in 
their societies, leading to more marriage break-ups25. 
In addition, as men have migrated to low skilled jobs in South 
África, the educational profile has changed in Lesotho so that most 
23 Andre Leliveld, "The Effects of Restrictive South African Migrant Labor Policy on the Surviva! of Rural 
Households in Southern África: A Case Study from Rural Swaziland," World Development, vol. 25, no. 1, 
2001, pp. 1839-49 and G. R Ferrara, "Marriage and Conjugal Roles in Swaziland: Persistence and Change," 
International Journal of Soclology of the Family, vol. 21, no. 2, 1991, pp. 89-128. 
24 Andre Leliveld, "The Effects of Restrictive South African Migrant Labor Policy," p. 1843. 
25 I.V.O. Modo, "Migrant Culture and Changing Face of Family Structure in Lesotho," Journal of 
Comparative Family Studies, vol. 32, no. 3, 2001, pp. 443-52. 
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of the females leñ behind have acquired more education than males. 
These changes have in turn affected the marriage patterns whereby the 
educated females are less willing to get married, particularly to men 
in distant South African mines. Data further reveáis that 32 per cent of 
the respondents in a survey indicated that women's superior education 
was responsible for the incessant marriage break-ups; 66 per cent 
agreed that education among women had created a new family pattern 
of cohabitation whereby women prefer to live with men who are not 
their husbands. With the escalation in bride-wealth costs, many men are 
marrying late, well beyond 30 years of age26. 
Elsewhere in África, the mobility of young males in search of 
opportunities in urban áreas remains a constant feature of migration. 
Women who mi grate are mainly the educated, those seeking to join 
husbands already in towns, or the heads of the burgeoning number of 
single-parent families. These trends have undermined the solidity of the 
traditional family, created new family structures, and transferred social 
responsibilities at the expense of traditional institutions. The impact of 
migration on divorce and separation is most felt where urban males 
abandon their wives in rural settings. While the durability of marriages 
in traditional structures was strengthened by the control maintained 
by kinship ties, new migration patterns have increased the prospects 
of divorces, separation, and the opportunity for múltiple partners27.In 
most cases, migration encourages males to have wives in the rural áreas 
and other wives or sexual partners in urban settings. Since housing 
conditions in urban áreas prohibit several wives to live together, 
"matricentric" households have emerged whereby an increasing number 
of households consist of a wife and children visited frequently by the 
husband. Although these unions represent a modern adapted versión 
of polygyny, they contribute to family break-ups and the upsurge of 
female-headed households. Solidarity between spouses is weakened by 
separation due to migration28. 
More important, the outcomes of migration movements, notably 
polygynous unions without regular cohabitation, have put additional 
pressures on the social and economic responsibilities of women. For the 
most part, the conditions of women have deteriorated because absent 
husbands who migrate to cities for a lengthy period often abdicate their 
economic roles. Thus overall economic changes growing from migration 
26 Modo, "Migrant Culture and Changing Face of Family Structure ¡n Lesotho," p. 449. 
27 Dominique Meekers and A. Calves, "'Main' Girlfriends, Girlfriends, Marriage, and Money: The Social 
Context of HIV Risk Behavior in Sub-Saharan África," Health and Transition, vol. 7, no. 1, 1997, pp. 361-
75. 
28 Lauras-Lecoh, Family Trends and Demographic Transition in África," pp. 486-87. 
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have forced women to play an even greater part in providing for their 
children's subsistence either through food production or off-farm 
income-generating activities. With little means of bringing pressures to 
bear on their husbands, women have continued to bear most of the costs 
incurred in the households. 
The impact of migration on African families is two-sided, precisely 
because of the tensión between diminishing opportunities in the 
agricultural sector coupled with land shortages and the persistence of 
social norms of patriarchy. Migration is a rational response to poor 
employment opportunities and land hunger in rural áreas, but this trend 
has loosened traditional social control mechanisms that regulated social 
reciprocities and responsibilities within families. New family structures 
have therefore emerged to capture 
the straddling of populations between urban and rural environments. 
The choices of being either permanent rural residents or urbanites are 
open to very few Africans. 
Globalization has also fostered new forms of migration as Africans 
seek better economic opportunities in Europe, the Middle East, and 
North America. The worsening economic circumstances and political 
instability have forced the best-educated Africans to leave home and 
work abroad. For the majority of these migrants, migration is part of 
the struggle against both debilitating poverty and implicit and explicit 
forms of political repression. 
Africa's track record on civil war, violent conflict, strife and 
political instability has, with a large measure, contributed to refugee 
flows. By 1995 África contained one third of the world's refugees. 
About 10 million people have been the victims of forced migration29. 
In most cases, neighboring countries host refugees from each other 
(Table 5). For example, there are Mauritanian refugees in Mali, and 
Malian refugees in Mauritania. One of the impacts of the wars in the 
continent is the increasing number of widowed women, female-headed 
households, and orphans. 
Like rural-urban migration, international migration is a double-
edged sword to families, furnishing potential economic benefits through 
remittances, but also breaking the social bonds of amity that sustain 
families. Moreover, while most international economic migrants 
are compelled to flee their homes for diverse reasons, many are 
constrained by tightened restrictions on their mobility. As governments 
of industrialized countries have implemented restrictive immigration 
policies to regúlate the supply of labor from poor countries, most of the 
29 UNHCR, October 1996 Report. 
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Table 5: Estimated Refugee Populations in Sub-Saharan África as of December31,1996 
ASYLUM COUNTRIES REFUGEES* SOURCEco 
Liberia, Sierra Leone 
Rwanda, Angola, Sudan, Burundi, Uganda 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Chad and Others 
Burundi, Rwanda, Congo, others 
Somalia, Sudan, Djibouli, Kenya 
Liberia 
Sudan, Congo, Rwanda 
Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, others 
Angola, Congo, others 
Sierra Leone 
Mauritania, others 
Sudan, Chad, others 
Togo, Liberia 
Mali, Chad 
Mali, others 
Angola, Somalia, Nigeria, Congo and others 
Somalia, Ethiopia 
Congo Burundi 
Angola, Chad and others 
Mauritania, others 
Mauritania, others 
C 
Liberia 
Congo, Rwanda 
Togo, Nigeria 
Ghana 
Guinea, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, South África, others 
Uganda, Congo, Ethiopia, Central Afr Rep, Kenya, Eritrea, others 
Guinea, Liberia 
Sudan, others 
Tanzania, Congo, Rwanda 
Congo, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi 
Congo, Zambia, Congo Brazzaville, South África, Namibia 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, S. África 
Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania, Algeria 
Senegal, Mali 
Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti 
Ghana, Benin 
Guinea-Bissau, Gambia 
Central Afr Rep, Sudan, Congo Brazza, Niger, Nigeria 
Algeria 
Congo 
Ethiopia 
Togo 
Guinea 
Dem Rep of Congo 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Ethiopia 
Ivory Coast 
Uganda 
Kenya 
Zambia 
Liberia 
Senegal 
Central African Rep 
Ghana 
Niger 
Burkina Faso 
South África 
Djibouti 
Rwanda 
Congo Brazzaville 
Guinea-Bissau 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Sierra Leone 
Burundi 
Benin 
Togo 
650 
455 
395 
335 
326 
320 
225 
186 
126 
100 
51 
36 
35 
27 
26 
23 
22 
20 
16 
15 
15 
15 
15 
12 
11 
10 
SOURCE COUNTRIES REFUGE 
Liberia 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Sierra Leone 
Eritrea 
Burundi 
Rwanda. 
Angola 
Dem Rep of Congo 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Etiopia 
Togo 
Senegal 
Chad 
Niger 
Uganda 
Djibouti 
Ghana 
755 
467 
434 
350 
343 
285 
257 
220 
117 
80 
65 
58 
30 
17 
15 
15 
15 
10 
10 
* Number of Refugees (lOOOs). 
Note: Table includes countries with 
Source: US Committee for Refugees 
10,000 or more refugees. 
• WorldRefugee Survey 1997 
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migrants become either illegal or have few opportunities of 
employment30. Despite the restrictions on migration, the rising numbers 
of able-bodied men and women who are found washing up on the shores 
of the Mediterranean Sea demónstrate the determination of migrants to 
reach Europe. 
To underscore the enormity of this problem, UNICEF has estimated 
that cross-border smugglers in Central and West África enslave 200,000 
children a year. Traffickers tempt victims with job offers and offers of 
adoption in wealthier countries. They in turn keep them in subservience 
through physical violence, debt bondage, passport confiscation, and 
threats of violence against their families31. These insidious forms of 
"migration" are thriving on the margins of globalization as African 
states lose the ability to control and pólice the activities of economically 
powerful non-state actors. 
Table 6: Migrant Sending and Receiving Regions, 1990-1995 
REGIÓN 
ÁFRICA 
• Eastern 
• Central 
• Northern 
ce ¡S • Southern 
H • Western 
W ASIA 
r, • Eastern 
Z • South Central 
9 • Southeastern 
W • Western 
LATÍN AMERICA 
CARIBEAN 
CENTRAL AMERICA 
SOUTH AMERICA 
M EUROPE 
g • Eastern 
3 • Northern 
§ • Southern 
O • Western 
5 NORTH AMERICA 
3 OCEANIA 
g AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND 
OTHER OCEANIA 
NET MIGRANTS (thousands) 
-63 
-128 
4 
69 
2 
0.1 
-1.366 
-171 
-664 
-485 
-46 
-392 
-99 
-202 
-91 
739 
-109 
47 
-20 
821 
971 
111 
122 
-11 
RATE (per 1,000 population) 
-0.1 
-0.6 
0.1 
0.5 
0.04 
0.01 
-0.4 
-1 
-5 
-11 
0.03 
-0.9 
-2.9 
-1.7 
-3 
1 
0.04 
5 
-1 
4.6 
3.4 
5.8 
5.8 
-1.7 
Source: UN, World Population Prospecls, the 1994 Revisión (New York, UN 1995): 128. 
30 Aderanti Adepoju, "Receñí Trends in International Migration in Sub-Saharan África," International Social 
Science.Journal, vol. Vol. 52, no. 2, 2000, pp. 383-94. 
31 UNICEF, The State of The Worlcls Children. New York: UNICEF, 2000; and Asmita Naik, "Protecting 
Children from Prolcclors: Lessons ¡rom West África," Forced Migration Review, vol. 15, October 2002, pp. 
16-19 
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III. DEMOGRAPHIC AGEING, RETIREMENT AND ITS SOCIO-
ECONOMIC IMPACT 
África has been greatly impacted by global ageing against the 
backdrop of deterioration of social and family support systems that 
once sustained older persons. UN Population statistics show that the 
proportion of older persons in África will likely double from 5 per 
cent to 10 per cent over the next 50 years32. The aged in África have 
traditionally found care within the informal structures of the family. 
Inter-generational income transfers from the young to the oíd did 
provide, for the most part, the solé means of economic security in oíd 
age. The traditional care systems in África were rooted in complex 
family patterns that included reciprocal care and assistance among the 
generations, with older persons being not only on the receiving end, 
but also fulfilling meaningful active roles. Although emotional ties 
and economic support remain strong in África in comparison with 
industrialized countries, economic decline and social breakdown have 
consigned older persons to poverty and marginalization33. Moreover, 
national governments have not developed appropriate social welfare 
policies that cater to the rapidly ageing populations. Consequently, with 
social welfare typically occupying a low priority at national levéis, 
the burdens of caring for older persons have gravitated even more to 
resource-constrained families. 
Even in relatively affluent South África with a developed pensión 
system for most of its urban workers, the quality of Ufe of older persons 
has deteriorated over the years because of poverty and inadequate 
housing. Some South African communities have attempted to mitígate 
the social strains on older persons by emphasizing multi-generation 
households. A study in KwaZulu Natal shows, for instance, that 
grandmothers with pensions have added valué to society by taking care 
of their families even if they were widowed and no longer able to hold 
down a job34. Similarly, other urban communities have launched pilot 
schemes where able older persons are paid to provide childcare in a 
well-funded setting; these schemes utilize the skills of older persons 
and keep them as active participants in the communities in which they 
live. Unique to South África, these schemes have enhanced a culture 
32 United Nations Population División, World Population Prospects: The 2000 /?ev/s/o«, New York, Department 
of Economie and Social Affairs, p. 15. 
33 Nana Araba Apt, "Ageing and the Changing Role of the Family and Community: An African Perspcctive," 
International Social Security Review, vol. 55, no. 2, 2002, pp. 39-47; and Apt, Coping with Oíd Age in a 
Changing África. London: Aldershot, 1996. 
34 A. Sotshongaye and Valerie Moller, '"My Family Eats This Money Too'", p. 14..S. Van Der Berg, "Ageing, 
Public Finance, and Social Security in South África," Southern African Journal ofGerontology, vol. 7, no. 
1, 1998, pp. 3-7 
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of caring, in which the community and family take responsibilities for 
older persons and are willing to play an active role through voluntary 
organizations in assisting the less fortúnate35. 
Table 7: List of Social Security Programs in Sub-Saharan África, By Type 
COUNTRY 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Fasso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Eritrea 
Central Afr Rep. 
Chad 
Congo Brazzaville 
Ivory Coast 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Cambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Kenya 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Níger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
South África 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
DR Congo 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Oíd age survivors 
and disabilitv 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Sickness and 
raaternity 
X 
Workers' 
compensa tion 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Unemployment 
insurance 
X 
Family 
allowances 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Source: Social Security Programs Throughout the World{\997), Social Security Administration, Office of Re-
search and Statistics. Research Report # 65. 
35 S. Van Der Berg, "Ageing, Public Finalice, and Social Security in South África," Southern African Journal of 
Gerontology, vol. 7, no. 1, 1998, pp. 3-7; and Valerie Moller, "Innovations to Promote an Intergenerational 
Society for South África to Promote the Well Being of the Black African Elderly," Society in Transition, vol. 
29, no. 1, 1998, pp. 1-11. 
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Furthermore, urbanization has had a negative effect on the support 
mechanisms that dealt with older persons. Urban living means that 
the oíd and the young are no longer living in the same households; 
modern arrangements have destroyed the key social welfare features 
that provided for intergenerational support. There is a gender dimensión 
to the precarious nature of older persons in África. Studies throughout 
the región reveal that the number of older women living in isolation has 
increased owing to the outward migration of children to urban áreas; 
more older women than men consider their status within the family 
to have deteriorated primarily because of widowhood and economic 
dependency. In oíd age, widowed women in África often live on the 
margins of communities that are equally impoverished36. 
The scale of marginalization is more evident in rural áreas where 
the social protection of older persons has eroded because of increasing 
poverty, lack of infrastructure such as health care, education, and social 
services. Inequalities experienced early in life, in particular access to 
education and health care, have critical bearings on the status and well 
being of the aged. Because of urbanization, the young generations who 
traditionally catered to older persons have migrated to cities, leaving 
the aged behind in rural áreas. Yet few urban dwellers have the means 
to maintain the care of the rural aged. In addition, mandatory retirement 
programs that are common throughout África relégate the aged to 
the rural áreas without adequate economic opportunities. A study of 
the transformation of care of the aged in Kenya captured their social 
isolation and squalid conditions. The increase in the aged population 
has been accompanied by economic strains that have reduced the ability 
of families to cope. Although the government has made rhetorical 
commitments to addressing the plight of older persons, there are very 
few institutions that care for the aged. Moreover, most of older persons 
living in such institutions are opposed to them because they aliénate 
them from their families. Consequently, a bulk of older persons feel 
isolated, bored, and limited in their interactions with other members of 
the community37. 
3.1. Policy Implications concerning Ageing and Older Persons 
The challenge facing African countries is how to design 
intergenerational support systems that would intégrate the older 
population back into mainstream social life. This would mitígate the 
36 World Bank, Averting the Oíd Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Oíd and Promote Growth. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994. 
37 M. A. Nyangweso, "Transformations of the Aged Among Africans: A Study of the Kenyan Situation/Mgmg 
and Mental Health, vol. 2, no. 3, 1998, pp. 181-85. 
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consequences of urban migration and rural poverty and help reduce the 
debilitating impact of marginalization of the vulnerable populations. 
Although innovative programs such as South Africa's that strengthen the 
bonds linking older persons to the family, the broader problem for older 
persons lies in socioeconomic programs that replace the fast declining 
traditional care systems. Adequate food, housing, and healthcare are 
essential in later Ufe. Yet the attainment of these essentials hinges on the 
gradual reduction of poverty and social exclusión as key elements of any 
policy that foster social integration of older persons. Comprehensive 
programs meeting these needs should proceed from the recognition that 
in African societies, the welfare of older persons cannot be detached 
from that of society as a whole38. Henee policies ought to focus on: 
• Integration of socioeconomic concerns of older persons in broader 
national budgetary and development plans; 
• Encouraging mutual assistance programs in both urban and rural 
áreas that seek to expand the opportunities of pensioners and 
retirees; 
• Supporting poverty reduction programs in rural áreas that 
specifically address the plight of older persons; 
• Providing tax incentives to community programs undertaken by 
older persons and their families that support the enhancement of 
income security; 
• Supporting rural assistance programs that focus on widows, as the 
most vulnerable group among older persons; 
• Supporting urban community childcare programs that draw from 
the labor and experiences of the growing population of the aged; 
• Fostering broad-based national socioeconomic programs that 
promote the quality of life of older citizens; 
• Encouraging economic policies that reduce the marginalization of 
rural communities that nave most of the older populations. 
IV. THE IMPACT OF HIV/AIDS 
Twenty years after evidence of a mysterious new disease first 
appeared in the medical literature, HIV/AIDS continúes its devastating 
march across sub-Saharan África. It is now the leading cause of death 
on the continent. It has already claimed the lives of more than 18 million 
38 Nana Araba Apt, "Ageing and the Changing Role of the Family and Community: An African Perspective," 
International Social Security Review, vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 42-47. 
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Africans. In the year 2001 alone, two million people died as a result 
of HIV/AIDS - ten times the death toll of all the continent's conflicts 
combined. (see Table 8). Another 28 million Africans are living with 
HIV/AIDS today, the vast majority of them in the prime of their lives as 
workers and parents. In 16 countries, more than one of every ten adults 
is HlV-positive. Despite promising developments over the past year, 
the situation is growing worse. More than 10,000 Africans are newly 
infected each day, nearly four million every year. If effective action is 
not taken, the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) 
estimates that 40 percent of today 's 15-year-olds will ultimately acquire 
HIV in countries such as Ethiopia and Cote d'Ivoire, and 60 percent in 
countries such as South África and Zambia. 
Sub-Saharan África has suffered the greatest impact of any región 
thus far because it was struck first, it started from a base of weak public 
health infrastructure, and it has not mounted an adequate response. 
Some countries -notably Senegal and Uganda- have stemmed or 
reversed the spread of the epidemic. But most have not, despite having 
national HIV/AIDS programs. Their efforts have fallen short for several 
reasons: there has been insufficient government commitment and 
leadership; programs have been inadequately fmanced; support from the 
international community has been too slow, especially in scaling up or 
replicating programs that have proven effective; not enough resources 
have reached communities or civil society, which implement some of 
the most successful activities; and programs have been too narrowly 
focused. 
Most of those infected are in the age group 20 to 49 years and the 
overwhelming majority are parents. Furthermore, the overwhelming 
majority of all those infected do not know they are infected. Many 
women are indirectly diagnosed when they are still well through the 
diagnosis of HIV infection in their children. Many men do not get 
diagnosed until they have a clinically observable HlV-related illness. In 
most households where there is one infected person, there will probably 
be three or more: both parents and one or more children. 
The AIDS epidemic has had far reaching effects on family. Many 
of the most striking images of the HIV epidemic are of families, but of 
unfamiliar families: female-headed family, grandparent surrounded by 
grandchildren, adolescent-headed families, often siblings and cousins 
bonded together, dying adults tended by their children and communities 
as families try to support victims of HIV/AIDS. The age group most 
affected occupies a critical position in families and communities: 
as heads of households, the labor forcé and leaders in society. HIV 
infections cluster in families in which both parents are often HIV-
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positive, placing enormous strains on the capacity of families to cope 
with the psychological and economic consequences of the illness. 
Consequently, there has been a progressive disintegration of families, as 
they become ineffective social and economic units. As AIDS devastates 
the traditional support systems for older persons, the latter are forced 
to take on the burdens of child care under conditions of increasing 
personal impoverishment. 
AIDS has also exacted a particularly heavy toll on young women. 
Sub-Saharan África is the only región where more women than men 
are HlV-positive. In some countries, rates among girls aged 15-19 are 
5 to 6 times higher than among boys in the same age group. A host 
of factors account for the greater prevalence among women, including 
economic dependence, limited autonomy and bargaining power, legal 
marginalization, certain cultural practices, social notions of masculinity, 
low educational attainment, and the lack of female-controlled prevention 
methods. 
AIDS is also creating unprecedented social welfare challenges: it has 
already orphaned about 14 million African children, the number is likely 
to double by 2010. Before the spread of HIV, roughly 1 in 50 children in 
developing countries was orphaned. Today the proporción has reached 1 
in 6 in the hardest-hit countries, a share unparalleled in recorded history. 
This is likely to push the age dependency ratio well above 1.0 and is 
already placing extreme strains on coping mechanisms 39. 
4.1. Economic Factors 
In economic terms the epidemic has already reversed many 
development gains of the past generation and now threatens to undermine 
the next. Its developmental impact has only begun to be felt and could 
persist for decades. Cross-country regressions suggest that AIDS is 
already costing sub-Saharan África an estimated 0.7-1.0 percent of per 
capita growth each year. In the worst hit countries, World Bank models 
have projected that by 2010 AIDS may reduce aggregate output by 15-
20 percent, and per capita consumption by nearly 10 percent. UNAIDS 
estimates that the annual loss in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth per person as a result of AIDS is estimated to be 0.8% by 2010. 
For example, in Uganda, (one of the most highly affected countries) 
estimates of the National Strategic Framework for HIV/AIDS activities 
for the period 2000/1-2005/6 indicate that the cost of interventions will 
be equivalent to the entire annual health budget of Ush.227 billion40 
39 "The Spread and Effect of HIV-1 Infection in Sub-Saharan África," Lancet, vol. 359, no. 9322, August 2002, 
pp. 2-7. 
40 US 1= 1795 Uganda shillings 
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Table 8: HIV Prevalence in Countries in Sub-Saharan África 
Countries worst affected by HIV/AIDS 
(prevalence rates >4% of adult population at end 1999) 
COUNTRY 
1 Botswana 
2 Swaziland 
3 Zimbabwe 
4 Lesotho 
5 Zambia 
6 South África 
7 Namibia 
8 Malawi 
9 Kenya 
10 Central African Republic 
11 Mozambique 
12 Djibouti 
13 Burundi 
14 Rwanda 
15 Cote d'Ivoire 
16 Ethiopia 
17 Uganda 
18 Tanzania 
19 Cameroon 
20 Burkina Fasso 
21 Congo 
22 Togo 
23 Democratic Rep. of Congo 
24 Nigeria 
25 Gabon 
ADULT 
RATES (%) 
35.80 
25.25 
25.06 
23.57 
19.95 
19.94 
19.54 
15.96 
13.95 
13.84 
13.22 
11.75 
11.32 
11.21 
10.76 
10.63 
8.30 
8.09 
7.73 
6.44 
6.43 
5.98 
5.07 
5.06 
4.16 
ADULTSAND 
CHILDREN 
290 000 
130 000 
1 500 000 
240 000 
870 000 
4 200 000 
4 200 000 
800 000 
2 100 000 
240 000 
1 200 000 
37 000 
360 000 
400 000 
760 000 
3 000 000 
820 000 
1 300 000 
540 000 
350 000 
86 000 
130 000 
1 100 000 
2 700 000 
23 000 
ADULTS (15-
49) 
280 000 
120 000 
1 400 000 
240 000 
830 000 
4 100 000 
4 100 000 
760 000 
2 000 000 
230 000 
1 100 000 
35 000 
340 000 
370 000 
730 000 
2 900 000 
770 000 
1 200 000 
520 000 
330 000 
82 000 
120 000 
1 100 000 
v 2 600 000 
" 22 000 
ORPHANS 
CUMÜLATIVF. 
66 000 
12 000 
900 000 
35 000 
650 000 
420 000 
420 000 
390 000 
730 000 
99 000 
310 000 
7 200 
230 000 
270 000 
420 000 
1 200 000 
1 700 000 
1 100 000 
270 000 
320 000 
53 000 
95 000 
680 000 
1 400 000 
8 600 
Source: Alan Whiteside, "Poverty and HIV/AIDS ¡n África," Third World Quarterly, vol. 233, no. 2, 2002, p. 
315. 
(without taking into account the cost of anti-retroviral therapy and 
drugs for treatment of opportunistic infections). While average 
monthly household income is estimated at Ush.31,500/-, AIDS related 
expenditures were Ush.35,000/- for burial and Ush.70,000/- for the 
medical costs of a terminal patient. A survey in Rakai district, (one of the 
most affected districts in the country) found that 65% of the households 
had to sell property to cover the cost of AIDS care41. 
AIDS reduces productivity, depletes scarce public and private 
capacity, raises the cost of doing business, exacerbates gender 
inequality, deepens poverty, diminishes school enrollment, overwhelms 
health systems, impairs human rights, weakens food security, erodes 
social capital, and progressively crowds out government development 
investments. AIDS is jeopardizing development investments in all 
sectors. 
41 AIDS ín África: Country by country, October 2000, for ADF 2000, UN AIDS and ECA 
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In Southern África, AIDS has worsened food shortages in Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and sorne parts 
of South África. According the UN Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO), the disease will cut agricultural labor by nearly a quarter in 
Zimbabwe by 2020, when 23 per cent of Zimbabwe's agricultural 
worker's will have died. Mozambique is expected to lose 20 per cent 
and Malawi 14 per cent of agricultural workers. Overall, crop production 
by small-scale and subsistence farmers throughout the región has been 
affected by the sickness, time spent looking after sick relatives, and loss 
of income42. 
Gender inequality and diminished education will help fuel the 
continued spread of HIV, driving a vicious circle. Unless the epidemic 
is addressed more forcefully, it will be impossible for África to attain 
the majority of the Millennium International Development Goals. 
The cumulative effect of the epidemic on determinants of social 
welfare include: 
• Sickness and death caused by HIV/AIDS causes a decline in 
individual and household productivity leading to food insecurity, 
family disintegration and weakening of the traditional family system 
for orphan care 
• The health system is being stretched by the need to care for people 
with AIDS, and there is still a large gap in funding to meet the full 
needs of a scaled-up care and prevention program. For example in 
Uganda in costs between $2 -$4 per person for a visit 
• The number of AIDS orphans is estimated at 15%- 20% of the total 
population in most Eastern and Southern African countries. Before 
parents die, these children usually cared for their sick parents causing 
psychologically traumatized children in most cases. 
• The quality of care-giving, education, nutrition and socialization is 
often poor for children with parents who are bed-ridden or dead. 
• The teaching profession, one of the linchpins of African development, 
has been disproportionately impacted by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In 
Central African Republic, for instance, 107 schools closed in 2000 
because of teacher shortages, largely due to AIDS. In Zambia, in 
the first 10 months of 1998, an estimated 1,300 teachers died—two-
thirds the number of new teachers trained annually. And in Botswana, 
mortality among primary school teachers has increased by 60 per 
cent since 1998. 
42 Lindy Heinecken, "Living in Terror: The Looming Security Threat to Southern África," African Security 
Review, vol. 10, no. 4,2002, p. 9; and Robert Walgate and Kerry Cullinan, "HIV/AIDS Deepens Food Crisis 
in Southern África," Bulletin ofthe World Health Organization, vol. 20, 2002. 
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HIV/AIDS affects entire family units consisting of women and their 
children, and extended families. The increasing loss of people due to 
AIDS undermines social and economic development gains achieved in 
the past. It is reversing gains in child survival as it is increasing the 
mortality rate of infants and children. It places enormous stress on 
infected individuáis and their families who are confronted with the 
demands of caring for the seriously ill and with the trauma of death. In 
addition, they also face the economic burdens of health care and funeral 
costs, as well as the loss of income when the breadwinner becomes ill. 
Consequently HIV/AIDS changes family structure and function. 
The problems for the family start before a member dies. At the loss 
of the breadwinner, women, children, older persons or single parents 
are usually left to run households, with severe implication for those 
concerned. Women and female-headed households are particularly 
vulnerable to the impact of HIV/AIDS. At the same time, women, girls 
tend to bear the burden of caring for the sick family member, and often 
have less care and support when they themselves are infected. The 
disturbing trend of HIV/AIDS is the growing number of orphans, and 
the increasing number of child-headed households. 
4.2. Socio-Economic Impact of HIV/AIDS on Rural Families 
Preliminary studies conducted indicate that HIV/AIDS affect men 
and women quite differently. According to the studies conducted by 
UNDP, in Uganda, 1997, the socioeconomic impact of the epidemic on 
rural families has different repercussions depending on whether it is the 
man/father or woman/mother who dies. The findings reveal that more 
women have lost their husbands to AIDS than men who have lost their 
wives. This is because polygamy is still being practiced. The comraon 
practice by men who have single wives is to remarry almost immediately 
after the death of the HlV-infected wife thereby transferring the infection 
to the new spouse and responsibility for the care of the children as well. 
Although it is not often that the children remain with the new wife 
(because they are often mistreated or discriminated against), more often 
than not a new home would be found for them, usually of the maternal 
aunt or of the grandparents. 
4.3. The Status of'Widows 
Women whose husbands die of AIDS are usually younger and thus 
tend to have dependants who need to be looked after. Irrespective of 
whether husbands die of HIV/AIDS or other causes, widows in sub-
sanaran África generally face the following problems: 
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• They risk having their properties, including land, confiscated as they 
do not have the right to inherit land, and sometimes they even lose 
the right to use land, unless the husband has left a will; 
• They may be inherited by the late husband's brother or cióse male 
relative; 
• They have solé responsibility for the children; 
• They suffer a significant loss of income and support services and 
these affect their standard of living; 
• They are usually overworked, have little time to themselves and are 
thus hard to reach and mobilize. 
The H1V epidemic often pushes women whose husbands have 
died of AIDS and their families below the poverty threshold, directly 
threatening the survival and well-being of their families. Female-
headed-households affected by AIDS become entrenched in poverty, 
as, in addition to the loss of labor and cash income, women have fewer 
legal rights than men, are often less literate than men, and have less 
access to support services, credit and inputs. The result is a marked 
increase in poverty among AIDS widows. This feminization of poverty, 
a key characteristic of the socio-economic impact of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, has far reaching consequences particularly for youths, with 
girls/young women being most affected. Given the prevalence of the 
disease, the marked increase in poverty among young women and their 
dependants is likely to have a profound impact on this región as a whole, 
particularly on food security, as it is women who are mainly responsible 
for food production. 
4.4. Status ofAIDS Orphans 
In the wake of AIDS, a second human tragedy is unfurling:.a 
massive number of orphans unparalleled in human history. The long-
term legacy of HIV/AIDS is the growth in the number of orphans who 
lose one or both parents, or caregivers. UNAIDS estimates that by the 
end of 2000 about 13 million children in sub-Saharan África under age 
fifteen would have lost their mother or both parents to AIDS. By 2010 
the number of orphans is projected to increase to 35 million43. The US 
Census Bureau also predicts that by 2010, in five countries in east and 
Southern África alone, over 30% of all children under age fifteen will 
be orphans, largely due to AIDS. 
The impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on orphans depends on a 
number of factors, including the socio-economic status of their families, 
43 UNAIDS: Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic - June 2000, p.27. 
Mqjor trenas affecting families in Sub-Saharan África 183 
the size of the family and their age. Losing parents to AIDS means that 
children have to assume new roles and new responsibilities within the 
nuclear as well as the extended family. Traditional roles, duties and 
responsibilities of family members become blurred, as AIDS places 
additional demands and pressures on orphans, particularly economic 
uncertainty, stigmatization and emotional insecurity. The following 
trends have been observed: 
• Children whose parents die of AIDS in towns are usually taken back 
to the rural áreas. They have to adapt to loss of parent(s) as well as to 
rural life. The security and stability of their family life is disrupted and 
there is no social safety net or mechanism to help children through this 
transition period. Education ceases, thereby increasing risk behavior 
among the older orphans especially girls. If both parents have died, 
the orphans are dispersed to various relatives. The disintegration of 
the family often means the children may not grow up in a family and 
will not receive attention and guidance from relatives. Grandparents 
might find it difficult to discipline and control young adults. 
• In some cases, some orphans may run away from home or from the 
extended family home to escape poverty that AIDS-afflicted and 
affected families are subjected to. 
• Some children might be sent to a town or abroad to make up for the 
loss of income and help support younger siblings. 
• It is also reported that the drop out rate in school among orphans is 
high because most of them cannot afford school fees and uniforms 
and some drop out because of stigma; absenteeism is equally high 
because some orphans have to attend to household chores; failure is 
also reported to be high. 
• A huge number of children without parental guidance spell trouble 
for the future44. 
4.5. The Impact of HIV/A1DS on the Household Economy and the Fa-
mily Valué System 
The impact of HIV/AIDS ranges from breakdown to disintegration 
of family, depending on whether one or both parents have died. The 
following coping mechanisms emerge: 
• Having already depleted meager resources and savings for costly 
treatment and funerals, the family suddenly finds itself deprived of 
44 J. Sengando and J. Nambí, "The Psychological Effects of Orphan hood: A Study of Orphans in Rakai Dís-
trict," Health Transition Review, vol. 10, 1997, pp. 105-24; and "Children Orphaned by AIDS: A New 
Challenge," Population Reports. vol. 29, no. 3, 2001, pp. 1-8. 
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labor, cash income and access to credit, as well as support services. 
The surviving spouse is faced with a situation to improvise for the 
loss of income. In widow-headed household children are unattended, 
meáis are poorly and hastily prepared and the widow's own health 
and diet deteriórate as a result of exhaustion and less food intake. 
Older children help with household chores and with agricultural 
activities. Children who have lost both parents are likely to work 
longer hours than children who have lost one parent and remain in 
the nuclear home. 
• HIV/AIDS victims' families may be stigmatized and/or ostracized 
- the AIDS stigma can sever the support widows and orphans 
would otherwise have from the extended family and the community. 
Stigmatization usually results in loss of respect within the extended 
family and community. Land área under cultivation may be reduced 
because of labor shortages. Loss of access to labor in the land may 
result in declining agricultural productivity that in combination with 
loss of cash income often leads to deterioration of the quality of 
household diet and reduction in the number of meáis. . 
4.6. Early Marriage/Unions and Childbearing 
It is also reported that young men and women are getting married, or 
raise families without being officially married, at increasingly younger 
age. One of the reasons cited is the rising cost of living and the economic 
valué of women. The bride price, which the groom has to pay for the 
bride, is getting prohibitive. Early marriage means early realization of 
economic valué of a daughter and parents who are struggling to raise 
many children may choose to marry their adolescent daughters earlier 
than they would have in different circumstances. The reason for the 
crisis within the family is largely attributed to new pressure caused by 
the epidemic. Of course there are other factors like war, displacement of 
people, break-up of families, rape, death, and poverty that all contribute 
to the erosión of traditional courtship, marriage, and erosión of social 
fabric as a whole. 
The socio-economic impact of HIV/AIDS is beginning to have 
an effect on the valué system of the family, as traditional norms and 
customs are breaking down under the pressures of the epidemic. 
4.7. Policy Implications of HIV/AIDS 
In order to tackle the daunting tasks to deal with the complexity of 
the problems faced by families in the wake of HIV/AIDS here are some 
challenges that need to be addressed: 
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• Long -term policies that select to change patemalistic institutions 
and that may end women's economic dependency on men. 
• Policies to correct occupational segregation, gender inequality, and 
feminization of poverty. 
• Support to orphans of AIDS and other vulnerable children (children 
that are caring for terminally ill parents, and children caring for their 
siblings). 
• More involvement of men in HIV prevention. 
• Formulation and implementation of policies to provide care to 
families with HIV. 
• Creation of family-coordinated AIDS care that meets the complex 
needs of infected women and their families. 
• Forging HIV/AIDS education policies that straddle abstinence, 
faithfulness, and condom-use domains. 
• High-level leadership and political commitment in HIV/AIDS 
campaigns across África. 
• International donor commitment to support countries that acknowledge 
HIV/AIDS as a threat to national development and security. 
V. THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION 
Globalization for África has had mixed results, deepening its 
opportunities to particípate in world-wide markets and accessing new 
technologies, yet further diminishing the possibilities for meaningful 
integration into this economy The dilemma revolves around what some 
observers have described as double marginalization: the continent's 
absolute decline in relation to the global economy; and the widening 
socioeconomic disparities in countries that have taken advantage of 
globalization45. The gradual erosión in Africa's share of global trade and 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has widened the pockets of poverty 
and deepened income inequalities among African countries and between 
África and the rest of the world. Africa's share of global trade accounted 
for only 1.6 per cent in the 1990s; the gross national product for sub-
Saharan África is less than 10 per cent of the United States46. Added 
45 David Apter, "Globalization and Its Discontents: An African Tragedy," Dissení, vol. 49, no. 2, Spring 2002, 
pp. 13-18 Samir Amin, "África: Living on the Fringe," Monthly Review, vol. 53, no. 10, March 2002, pp. 
41-51; and Frcderick Cooper, "What is the Concept of Globalization Good for? A Historical Perspcctivc," 
African Affairs, vol. 100, no. 399, April 2001, pp. 189-214. 
46 David Apter, "Globalization and Its Discontents: An African Tragedy," p. 14. 
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to this dismal picture are heavy indebtedness, ineñicient investment, 
inadequate services, poorly performing state corporations, low labor 
productivity, urban unemployment, declining agricultural production, 
weak administrative and health facilities, and eroding educational 
standards. All these factors lead to fragüe infrastructures, corruption, a 
dearth of skilled workers, and poor economic diversity. 
Africa's economic travails in the global división of labor were 
exacerbated since the 1980s by the onset of the Structural Adjustment 
Policies (SAPS) forced upon a majority of African countries by 
international financial institutions. Internally, SAPS heightened 
social inequalities within África, putting pressure on families, in 
particular women and children, even as the African state declined as 
a meaningful actor in the economic arena. The enormous pressures of 
liberalization advanced by international financial institutions to make 
African economies more competitive invariably reduced the ability of 
individual states to provide the wide array of socioeconomic safety nets 
that prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s47.Mountmgcriticismsagainstthe 
impact of SAPS in África led to belated shifts in lending policies to 
target poor and vulnerable groups, partially mitigating the social costs 
of adjustments. Subsequent policy platforms by international actors 
such as promotion of good governance in conjunction with economic 
liberalization, anti-poverty crusades, and mainstreaming gender in 
development, belie the enormous obstacles to redressing the ever-
widening global and national inequalities. 
Critics of the governance agenda of global financial institutions 
have, for instance, noted that there has been a progressive erosión 
of democratic governance through trade liberalization that has had 
devastating consequences for families48. In addition to weakening the 
state as the arena of local contests over the production and distribution 
of goods and services, globalization has led to the decline of Africa's 
already-weak manufacturing sectors through open trading regimes. 
Throughout África, this has greatly affected jobs in urban settings, 
reducing the economic capacity of family sustenance. Globalization 
promises that higher labor costs in developed countries will steadily 
lead to the migration of low-skilled jobs to África, but this has yet to 
occur because of political instability, relative geographic isolation, and 
inadequate infrastructures49. The paradox of globalization for África is 
47 Samir Amin, África: Living on the Fringe," pp.48-49. 
48 N. Folbre, "Debating Business: Women and Liberalization at the Council for Foreign Relations," Signs: 
Journal of Women in Culture and Society, vol. 26, no. 4, 2001, pp. 1259-63. 
49 Asfaw Kumssa, "Globalization and Regionalization: Implications for Developing Countries," Regional 
Development Dialogue, vol. 19. no. 2, Autumn, 1998, pp. 7-16 
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starkly illustrated by the fact that its economies need to be securely 
integrated into global markets, primarily through prívate investment, 
but this integration exacerbates the problems globalization is supposed 
to solve. Prívate investment in the high technology sector employs 
relatively few workers, henee increasing rather than decreasing patterns 
of social inequalities. Furthermore, the 1990s revealed that market-
driven reforms produce marginality, social disruption, and political 
turbulence, expanding opportunities for the few without a corresponding 
enlargement of opportunities for the many50. 
The tendeney of globalization to deepen inequalities in African 
countries that have embraced it is more instructive to families 
because these differences affect the household more visibly. Recent 
developments in commodity and labor markets associated with 
the process of globalization have posed new uncertainties for rural 
people dependent on agriculture. One of the major stumbling blocks 
at the Seattle, Quebec City, and Doha meetings of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) was the liberalization of trade in agriculture. Rich 
country governments are opposed to such liberalization; instead they 
prefer to carve out farm produets as an exception to free trade, so that 
their politically powerful agricultural sectors do not have to compete 
with poorer countries. Toward that end, rich countries lavish $300 
billion on their farmers every year, an amount that is more than the 
national incomes of all of sub-Saharan África5'.To improve the lives of 
the rural poor eking out livings through agriculture requires removing, 
not adding, trade barriere. 
As the agricultural sector in África has declined through years of 
government neglect and the new global trade barriers, households have 
tried to diversify their resource base to cope with market demands 
and minimize income insecurity. In the prevailing circumstances, 
agriculture alone no longer provides a secure and sustainable living for 
rural people, even for those who own relatively large land holdings. 
Henee a majority of them need predictable sources of cash earnings to 
maximize household livelihood security52.This has inevitably spawned 
male migration in search of work in national or international labor 
markets, leaving women to take over the work on the land or the nonfarm 
family business. But male migration in insecure urban labour markets 
50 David Apter, "Globalization and Its Discontents," p. 14. 
51 Kenneth Kart, "World Trade: África Seeks to Enhance its Role," The Courier, no. 185, Mareh-April 2001, 
pp. 16-18; Anne-Marie Mouradian, "A New WTO is Launched, "The Courier, no. 190, January-February 
2002, pp. 6-8; Ferial Haffajee, "Doha Diary: Developing Countries Stand Strong," The Courier, no. 190, 
January-February 2002, pp. 9-12. 
52 T. Straubhaar and A. Wolter, "Globalization, Internal Labor Markets, and Migration oí" Flighly Skilled," 
Inlereconomic.s, vol. 32, no. 4, 1997, pp. 174-80. 
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hardly compensates for the deterioration in incomes; the redundancies 
in labor-intensive sectors, especially among the unskilled and poorly 
educated, guarantees that there are no obvious benefits to migration. 
Consequently, in both rural and urban áreas, the effects of globalization 
have continued to marginalize the labor and resource needs for human 
reproduction, thereby marginalizing women and the poor53. 
In some African countries, there have been challenges to the 
reach of globalization particularly from women's groups protesting 
their marginalization. In Tanzania, for instance, instead of accepting 
the power of the global economy, women tried to créate alternative 
formal and informal collective strategies through the use of social 
networks in the wake of the government's diminishing economic 
role54. More dramatically, women in Nigeria's oil-producing Niger 
Delta have physically blocked the access of oil workers to production 
sites, protesting environmental degradation and the exclusión of their 
children from employment in these companies55. These emerging local 
challenges in África are partly emboldened by the diverse, albeit growing 
transnational civil society movements that are contesting various facets 
of globalization. In the sphere of women's rights, the global feminist 
network DAWN (Development Alternatives with Women for a New 
Era) has been since 1987 at the forefront championing the development 
of organizational capacities among women to improve the lot of their 
families56. One of the positive elements of globalization is the ability 
of marginalized groups to tap into the substantial resources of such 
transnational actors. 
Ultimately, however, in the absence of fair and just global rules, 
globalization will increase the ability of the strong to advance their 
interests to the detriment of the weak especially in the área of trade, finance 
and technology. Africa's inability to harness the process of globalization 
results from structural impediments to growth and development in the 
form of resource outflows and unfavorable terms of trade. To mitígate 
the gross inequalities and the concentration of the benefits fostered by 
globalization, African countries have recently embarked on program, 
the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) that seeks aid 
and debt relief from the developed economies in exchange for universal 
53 "Measuring Globalization: Who's Up, Who's Down? Forelgn Policy, no. 134, January-Fcbruary 2003, pp. 
1-13. 
54 S. Bergeron, "Political Economy Discourses of Globalization and Feminist Politics," Signs: Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society, vol. 26, no. 4, 2001, pp. 983-1006. 
55 Charmaine Pereira, "Configuring 'Global,' 'National,' and 'Local' in Governance Agendas and Women's 
Struggles in Nigeria," Social Research, vol. 69, no. 3, Fall 2002. 
56 Charmaine Pereira, "Configuring 'Global,' 'National,' and 'Local' in Governance Agendas and Women's 
Struggles in Nigeria," p. 800. 
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norms of good governance and economic performance. Following the 
Group of 8 summit in Canadá in 2002, donor nations pledged $6 billion 
annually by 2006 that would help África achieve 7 per cent annual 
economic growth and reduce the number of people living in poverty by 
half by the year 2015. 
Table 9: Population growth ¡n Sub-Saharan África, 1970-1980,1980-1992 
COUNTRY 
Sub-Saharan África 
Botswana 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Cameroon 
Central African Rep 
Chad 
Ivory Coast 
Congo 
Etiopía 
Gabon 
Ghana 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Mali 
Mauritania 
M a u ritáis 
Malawi 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
South África 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
1970 -1980 
Average Annual Population 
Growth rate (%) 
2.8 
3.7 
2.7 
2.1 
2.9 
2.2 
2.0 
4.0 
2.8 
2.6 
4.6 
2.2 
3.7 
2.3 
2.1 
2.4 
1.5 
3.1 
2.9 
2.9 
3.3 
2.1 
2.9 
2.7 
2.9 
2.9 
3.0 
2.9 
1980-1992 
Average Annual Population 
Growth rate (%) 
3.0 
3.4 
3.1 
2.6 
2.8 
2.6 
2.4 
3.8 
3.1 
3.1 
3.4 
3.2 
3.6 
2.7 
2.6 
2.4 
1.1 
3.2 
3.3 
3.0 
2.9 
2.4 
3.1 
2.5 
2.7 
3.0 
3.2 
3.3 
Source: World Bank 1994 
To meet these goals, África would still need to fill an annual 
resource gap of about $64 billion, much of it from domestic sources57. 
NEPAD envisages that domestic resource mobilization will come 
from increased national savings by firms and households, effective tax 
collection, rationalizing government expenditure, and reversing capital 
57 Declara fian on the Implemeníation of the New Partnershipfor African Development (NEPAD), Durban, South 
África, July 2002; Kempe Ronald Hope, "From Crisis to Renewal: Towards a Successful Implementation 
of the New Partnership for African Development," African Affairs, vol. 101, no. 404, July 2002, pp. 387-
402; and Ernest Harsch, "África Still Waiting for Genuine 'Partnership'," África Recovery, vol. 16, no. 2-3, 
September 2002, pp. 26-28. 
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flight by improving the conditions for domestic investments. To ensure 
that economic development is meaningful to the already deteriorating 
conditions of African families, NEPAD has urged signatories to pay 
special attention to improving the physical infrastructure, especially 
roads, railways and power systems; human development, focusing 
on health and education, including skills development; agriculture; 
and promoting the diversification of production and exports, with a 
focus on market access to industrialized countries. Framers of NEPAD 
acknowledge that Africa's long-term development needs to be anchored 
in the determination of African people to "extricate themselves and the 
continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusión in a 
globalizing world58". Calling for a new relationship between África and 
the international community, NEPAD foresees a context in which non-
African partners seek to complement Africa's own efforts. 
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